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Abstract: This study focuses on component sharing across product categories, in
contrast to earlier studies which examined component sharing within a specific
category. Cross-category component sharing creates the potential for diversified
product functionality by transferring new knowledge between categories, in
addition to streamlining development, as previously noted. We collected evi-
dence for this proposal from the Japanese digital audio-visual products market
in the late 2000s. Panasonic not only shared software modules and the design of
large scale integration (LSI) among products in the same category, but also
shared them among televisions and DVD recorders. Its competitors, Sony and
Sharp, used shared software and the design of LSI only within a product
category. Panasonic products were functionally more advanced than those of
Sony and Sharp. This study revealed two types of functionality diversification –
simple functional diversification and linked operations.
Keywords: component sharing, across product categories, functional diversifica-
tion of products, Japanese digital audio-visual products market, new product
development performance
1 Introduction
This study explores the effect of component sharing across product categories.
Existing research has examined component sharing within a product category,
showing that this type of component sharing makes development more efficient by
reducing the development effort required.1 This study suggests that cross-category
component sharing creates the potential for diversified product functionality,
*Corresponding author: Sayako Miura, Shujitsu University, Okayama, Japan,
E-mail: sayakomiura@shujitsu.ac.jp.
1 Cusumano/Nobeoka 1998; Gawer/Cusumano 2002; Halman et al. 2003; Muffatto/Roveda 2000.
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which is the result of new knowledge transfer between categories, in addition to
the previously noted streamlined development.
We collected evidence for this proposal from the Japanese digital audio-
visual products market in the late 2000s. Panasonic not only shared software
modules and the design of large scale integration (LSI) among products in the
same category, but also used the same architecture for different product cate-
gories, including televisions and DVD/Blu-ray (BD) recorders, and shared them.
Sharing was easy among digital products composed chiefly of semiconductors
and software (which is almost free from physical limitation) and Panasonic
exploited these opportunities. Its competitors, Sony and Sharp, used shared
software and LSI design within product categories. Panasonic products were
functionally more advanced than those of Sony and Sharp. This diversification
of functionality, which has not yet received extensive attention in the literature,
is the result of the cross-category sharing of components.
2 Theoretical background
The existing research into component sharing consists of two groups: intra-firm
component sharing within a product category and inter-firm component sharing
within a product category. Thought they differ in terms of the scope of sharing,
the effect was to improve product development efficiency.2
2.1 Intra-firm component sharing within a product category
A company can easily share components across various models by creating a
common interface between shared and unique components across product mod-
els,3 which reduces development activities.4 This in turn reduces the development
cost per model, so a company can efficiently increase the variety of product
models.5 Diversifying product models according to various customer needs
expands market-share.6 Studies observe this efficacy effect in product develop-
ment mainly in the consumer electronics industry7 and the auto industry.8
2 Cusumano/Nobeoka 1998; Gawer/Cusumano 2002; Halman et al. 2003; Muffatto/Roveda 2000.
3 Baldwin/Clark 2000; Ulrich 1995.
4 Cusumano/Nobeoka 1998.
5 Ulrich 1995.
6 Funk 2004; Cusumano/Nobeoka 1998; Sanderson/Uzumeri 1995.
7 Funk 2002; Sanderson/Uzumeri 1995.
8 Cusumano/Nobeoka 1998; Fisher et al. 1999; Muffatto/Roveda 2000.
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Common components may pose a challenge, in that these may make differ-
entiation among product models difficult.9 However, producers can achieve
differentiation by using distinct components.10 For example, though automo-
biles share a chassis, product model differentiation can be achieved by using
different interiors and exteriors. In addition, differentiation among product
models is possible not only through different product features, but also by
using different marketing channels and promotions.11
2.2 Inter-firm component sharing within a product category
Some researchers have investigated inter-firm sharing, wherein standardized
components are shared across companies. A company develops and sells stan-
dardized components to other companies who use them to develop end products.
This enables product variety without excessive increases in product development
activities at an industry-wide scale, because there are fewer duplicate components
developed and because buyers of the standardized components can develop end
products more efficiently. These standardized components also enable new
entrants without the knowledge and technology to make the components them-
selves, which also leads to greater product variety. Studies observe this phenom-
enon typically in the PC industry: Microsoft sells operating system and Intel sells
processors, and various computer makers buy them and develop PCs.12
Inter-firm component sharing also has its challenges. Buyers must differ-
entiate their products from competitors using the same standardized compo-
nents. This must be done through distinct parts and/or differentiated channels
and promotions.13 Sellers have to convince buyers to use standardized compo-
nents, often offering technical support to do so.14
2.3 Component sharing across product categories
According to the intra- and inter-firm component sharing literature, component
sharing primarily leads to product development efficiency. However, this
research proposes that component sharing diversifies product functions by
9 Desai et al. 2001; Kim/Chhajed 2000; Robertson/Ulrich 1998.
10 Robertson/Ulrich 1998.
11 Kotler/Armstrong 2013.
12 Cusumano 2004; Cusumano/Selby 1995; Gawer/Cusumano 2002.
13 In the PC industry, Dell succeeded in differentiation via direct sales (Dell/Fredman, 1999).
14 Gawer/Cusumano 2002.
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transferring new knowledge between product categories in addition to stream-
lining development. This new effects comes from cross-product category com-
ponent sharing in contrast to earlier work which examined component sharing
within a specific product category. Figure 1 illustrates the types of component
sharing strategies and the position of this research.
Since the early 2000s, cross-product category component sharing has
occurred in the consumer electronics industry. Sony developed a digital cam-
corder, televisions, and DVD recorders using a video and image processing LSI
originally developed for the PlayStation 2, a home video game console launched
in 2000.15 This new type of component sharing may not only streamline product
development, but also diversify product functions.
Product development efficiency derives from the same mechanism described
in previous studies. Sharing components eliminates duplicate product develop-
ment activities.
Research on human networking and knowledge transfer can be a basis for
exploring whether a cross-product category sharing strategy leads to product
functionality diversification. The human networking and knowledge transfer
research area suggests that knowledge from disparate products and industries
leads to innovation. A technology broker16 with a human network in different
industries transfers knowledge between industries. The knowledge that is well
known in one industry is new to the other industry. Therefore, the transferred
knowledge leads to innovation in the new industry.17 Transferring knowledge
across divisions within a diversified firm can also lead to innovation.18 While the
knowledge transfer research focuses on human networks, component sharing
across product categories may have similar effects because a component from
different products may represent new technological knowledge.
Figure 1: Component sharing
strategies.
15 Nikkei Microdevices (October 2001), p. 65; Nikkei Business (October 4, 2004), p. 42.
16 Hargadon/Sutton 1997.
17 Hargadon/Sutton 1997.
18 Miller et al. 2007; Tsai 2001.
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3 Research design
3.1 Case study
We employ a case study approach to explore the effects of a cross-product category
component sharing strategy because this strategy is a little known phenomenon.19
The case study provides an analysis of the Japanese digital audio-visual products
market between 2006 and 2010 because both cross- and within-product category
component-sharing strategies occurred in this market during this period.
We compare Panasonic, Sony, and Sharp, Japanese electronics companies,
in the Japanese television and DVD/BD recorder markets for two reasons. First,
they pursued different component sharing strategies. Panasonic used the same
architecture for different product categories, televisions and DVD/BD recorders,
and shared the software and design of the LSI among these products between
2006 and 2010. This cross-product component-sharing project is called UniPhier.
Its competitors, Sony and Sharp, used the same components within one product
category only. Therefore, a comparison between these entities allows for an
evaluation of a cross-product category component sharing strategy. Second,
Panasonic, Sony, and Sharp had large market shares in these products in
Japan, making a comparison appropriate.
3.2 Variables and measurement
We checked each company’s component strategy as the independent variable.
As for the dependent variable, we compared the product functionality for
Panasonic, Sony, and Sharp. Finally, we also compared development efficiency,
because a company can also invest a significant amount of resources to improve
product functionality.20 Therefore, we verified whether the product improvement
was via component sharing or investment.
We used the following sources of magazine and newspaper articles on
consumer electronics to determine the component strategy of each company as
independent variable: Itmedia, AV Watch, Nikkei Business, Nikkei Microdevices,
Nikkei Electronics, and Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun. 21
19 Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2013.
20 Productivity data is from Miura (2013).
21 Itmedia. http://www.itmedia.co.jp/ (12/31/2014) and AV Watch. http://av.watch.impress.co.
jp/ (12/31/2014). Nikkei Business, Nikkei Microdevices, Nikkei Electronics are printed magazines
and Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun is a newspaper.
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To compare the Panasonic product functionality with that of Sony and
Sharp, we listed all televisions and DVD/BD recorders launched in the
Japanese domestic market from 2006 to 2010 using Kakaku.com,22 the most
popular website for price comparisons of consumer electronics in Japan, which
covers almost all electronics products. We then collected the features for all
listed products from company press releases (Panasonic, Sony, and Sharp) and
articles on digital consumer electronics product from the magazines Itmedia and
AV Watch to create an original database.
To determine product development efficacy, we calculated the number of
engineers per product model.23 The number of product models was taken from
our database. The number of engineers was collected from the listed inventors in
patents, which three company applied for from 2006 to 2010, related to video
and audio processing technology related to televisions and DVD/BD recorders.
While this is not a highly reliable means to measure product development
efficacy, it is reasonable.
To measure the input resources of product development, we should ideally
measure all resources used, including labour, capital, and materials, though
these cannot be measured accurately. Therefore, previous studies measured only
labour input.24 This research adopts this method.
Previous research measured labour input in terms of person-hours per
product development project, which is the amount of work performed by engi-
neers, using a questionnaire survey.25 However, we collected the number of
engineers from patents. The patent data does not indicate the actual number
of engineers who are involved in the product development project or the mag-
nitude of their working hours, though both can be obtained through a ques-
tionnaire survey. However, it is still reasonable to measure labour input using
patents. We used international patent classification (IPC) and keywords to
identify the correct patent for the analysis to know the number of engineers.26
Since we compare these companies over a five-year period, an engineer’s aver-
age working hours at three companies should not differ significantly for this
longitudinal period. In addition, patent data is better than that from question-
naires on the point that they are free of retrospective bias.27
22 http://kakaku.com/ (12/31/2014).
23 Miura 2013.
24 Clark/Fujimoto 1991; Cusumano/Nobeoka 1998.
25 Clark/Fujimoto 1991; Cusumano/Nobeoka 1998.
26 See Miura (2013) for information that is more detailed.
27 Webb et al. 1981.
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To interpret the data from secondary sources, we held semi-structured inter-
views with 11 engineers at Panasonic from 2009 to 2012 for a total of 21 hours.
They belonged to one of following divisions: television, recorder, or semicon-
ductor – and engaged in the UniPhier project.
4 The case
4.1 Component sharing strategies
The difference between the component sharing strategies of Panasonic, Sony,
and Sharp is whether the components were shared across categories or not.
Panasonic made the LSI and software architecture the same for the different
product categories, and shared the design of the LSI and software. Figure 2
shows the UniPhier architecture, borne of the UniPhier project. Products devel-
oped based on this architecture have been launched since 2006.28
There are two technological changes in the background of this project: the
technological progress in semiconductors and digitalization. The increased infor-
mation processing ability of semiconductors allowed for digital audio-visual
products, though also increased the product development burden, especially for
software. For example, the software development for DVD recorders grew in 2004
Figure 2: UniPhier
architecture.
Source: Nikkei
Microdevices (October
2004), p. 80, modified
by the author.
28 Nikkei Electronics (06/16/2008), p. 104.
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to three times that of 2002 since they could process high-definition images.29
Simultaneously, the digitalization of audio-visual processing made components
easier to share than those for analogue processing because the processing shifted
to an integrated circuit and software, which are nearly free from any physical
limitations on sharing. Panasonic planned to share the LSI designs and software
across categories, and save on development through the opportunities presented
by digitalization. The company had already shared these within one category, and
aimed to further reduce its product development burden by sharing components
beyond a single category.30 Its competitors, Sony and Sharp, shared the LSI
designs and software only within one product category.31
4.2 Functionality diversification
Table 1 lists the shared functionality observed across product categories. Grey
cells indicate that a company launched products with these functions between
2006 and 2010. When cells for all three companies are coloured, it indicates that
they all introduced a product with the functionality listed in the left column. In
this case, there is a number in the right column showing the number of months
by which Panasonic preceded Sony and Sharp in the introduction of products
with the respective functionality. For example, the first column of Table 1 lists
AcTVila. After the introduction of televisions with this functionality, Panasonic,
Sony, and Sharp launched DVD/BD recorders with this functionality. However,
Panasonic introduced DVD/BD recorders with this functionality seven months
earlier than Sony, and 19 months earlier than Sharp.
Table 1 demonstrates two points. First, there are two types of functionality
diversification: simple diversification and linked operations. Simple function-
ality diversification is exactly that described in the theoretical development
section. By sharing components across product categories, the transferred com-
ponents diversify the product functionality. For example, Table 1 lists a YouTube
function, with which all three companies introduced TV, though only Panasonic
launched DVD/BD recorders with this function.
The second functional diversification, linked operations, involves a set of
products working together. By using common components, a set of products
works smoothly together. For example, HDMI Link enables a customer to use a
29 Nikkei Business (03/28/2005), p. 42.
30 Nikkei Electronics (08/11/2004), pp. 117–123.
31 Usually it is difficult to cooperate across product divisions. Panasonic successfully managed
the UniPhier project (Miura 2011).
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single remote control to operate both a television and a DVD/BD recorder. DLNA
Link makes it possible to watch recorded content on a DVD/BD recorder on a TV
in a different room. Both functionalities provide convenient home entertainment
systems when televisions and DVD/BD recorders work together.
Table 1 also indicates Panasonic’s superiority to Sony and Sharp in these
areas. For simple functionality diversification, Panasonic is superior to Sony and
Sharp, except for Sharp’s TV with long DTV recording times. In terms of linked
operations, Panasonic exceeded Sony and Sharp, except for Sony’s TV with
DLNA Link.
4.3 Product development productivity and knowledge transfer
Panasonic is superior to other companies in launching products with function-
alities matching products in different categories. However, it is important to
investigate whether these are realized through component sharing. Because
functional diversification can be achieved by investing significantly in develop-
ment, we investigated development productivity by the number of engineers per
product model and interviewed Panasonic engineers.
Table 2 shows the number of engineers per product model, which indicates
product development labour productivity. For televisions, Panasonic has the
fewest engineers per product model, implying that Panasonic was more produc-
tive than the other companies were. For DVD/BD recorders, Panasonic is as
productive as Sharp, and more productive than Sony. Since Panasonic achieved
better product functionality than Sharp, Panasonic was more productive. This
analysis indicates that Panasonic did not achieve product functionality diversi-
fication by investment.
Table 2: Engineers per product model.
Product Company Engineers per
product model
Number
of engineers
Number of
introduced models
TV Panasonic .  
Sony .  
Sharp .  
DVD/BD Recorder Panasonic .  
Sony .  
Sharp .  
Source: Data is from Miura (2013), pp. 58 and 63, modified by the author.
84 Sayako Miura
This analysis focuses on product models introduced in the Japanese market and
Japanese patents. However, the companies introduced the products worldwide.
Therefore, the number of engineers per model may not reflect reality, because
these engineers might develop products for markets outside Japan. To avoid this
issue, we investigated two kinds of data. First, the models introduced from 2006 to
2010 in the US market, the largest market in the world, were investigated using
CNET.32 Second, we collected the number of engineers by using patents, which
affiliated companies of each company outside Japan applied for.
We counted registered products in the CNET site, and checked whether it
was introduced in the U.S. by using the each company’s U.S. support site.
Panasonic and Sharp regarding the number of television models introduced,
which was 43 for Panasonic, 41 for Sharp, and 55 for Sony. This means that the
index, engineers per model, underestimates Sony’s efficiency as compared to
Panasonic and Sharp. However, in the case of Sony, we excluded the engineers
(that is inventors listed in patents) outside of Japan. In Panasonic’s case, patents
belonging to inventors who did not seem Japanese, inferred from their names
and addresses, were nonetheless applied for by Panasonic Japan. Therefore,
such patents were included in the analysis. However, Sony U.S.A. and entities in
countries other than Japan applied for patents of Sony with such inventors (that
is, inventors outside Japan), and these were excluded from the analysis.
Regarding Sharp, patents did not include such inventors. In total, these facts
imply that Panasonic’s labour productivity was the same or less than that of its
competitors, and it did not invest much to achieve functional diversification.
As for DVD/BD recorders, the same procedures were applied. Panasonic
introduced 22 models of recorders, Sony introduced 18 models, and Sharp did
not introduce any models. This fact implies that Panasonic did not invest
significantly to achieve functional diversification.
This labour productivity analysis consists with the interview data. As for
Internet-related functionality, Panasonic introduced its recorders with AcTVila
seven months earlier than Sony and 19 months earlier than Sharp. In addition,
only Panasonic introduced TVs and recorders with YouTube and Skype func-
tionality. Sony introduced only TVs with these functions and Sharp introduced
no products with these functions. Panasonic could easily transfer software
modules from televisions to recorders to realize these functions because of the
UniPhier common architecture, without which it is difficult or costly for a
company to perform such transfers. Takizawa, a Panasonic engineer for DVD/
BD recorders, said: “As for AcTVila, it was very easy to transfer it from
32 http://www.cnet.com/ (12/31/2014).
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televisions to recorders because of UniPhier. However, engineers at other com-
panies said that it was too difficult to transfer.”33 Fukuda, another engineer
working on the same product line, had the same view: “To make recorders with
internet functions would have required hundreds more engineers. Because there
is a common architecture, the recorders division did not need a lot of develop-
ment for these television functions.”34
We cannot exclude the possibility that Sony and Sharp made a strategic
decision that recorders did not require internet-related functionality. However,
Panasonic created this functional diversification efficiently by transferring soft-
ware modules originally developed for televisions to DVD/BD recorders.
Panasonic introduced DVD/BD recorders with HDMI Link so that a television
and a recorder could operate via one remote control, a product launched five
months earlier than Sharp, and 19 months earlier than Sony. Panasonic could do
this because televisions and recorders shared the same architecture, easing the
process of sharing the video and audio processing circuit and software. Kubo, a
Panasonic engineer at a semiconductor company, said: “Because our codec
hardware and software for video and sound have the same architecture, it was
easy to transfer them and make HDMI Link. Even without any special develop-
ment, we could create it. However, competitors must make significant develop-
ment efforts to create the same features.”35
This linked functionality, named VIERA Link, was successful in the market,
increasing the combined sales of televisions and DVD/BD recorders.36 Kubo also
pointed out: “When competitors saw this feature, they invested a lot to develop
the same functionality.” This is Panasonic’s view, not that of Sony or Sharp,
though Panasonic efficiently realized a linked operation that was successful in
the marketplace.
5 Discussion and conclusions
The case study of the Japanese digital audio-visual product market in the late
2000s indicates that component sharing creates a functional diversification
33 Interview with Shinichiro Takigawa (03/31/2011), translated by the author.
34 Interview with Hideki Fukuda (01/16/2012), translated by the author.
35 Interview with Tokuaki Kubo (11/25/2009), translated by the author.
36 The combined sales accounted for 40 to 50% of the sales in some stores (ITmedia: 04/04/
2007: http://www.itmedia.co.jp/lifestyle/articles/0704/13/news048.html (12/31/2014). Panasonic
senior managing director, Toshizo Ushimaru said “It is a hidden huge hit”, (Nikkei Sangyo
Shimbun (08/22/2006), p. 3).
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effect. This is a new finding, in addition to the efficiency effect known from the
previous literature, which focused only on component sharing within a product
category. The cross-product category component sharing strategy has recently
emerged because of the technological progress made in the fields of semicon-
ductors and digitalization. Sharing components with a wide range of products
creates functional diversification because the knowledge behind these products
is diverse. Since even more technological progress is expected in the fields of
semiconductors and digitalization, this type of component sharing will expand
hereafter, and greater functional diversification effects will be manifested.
This study revealed two types of functional diversification: simple functional
diversification and linked operations. Linked operations represent a new type of
differentiation, wherein a group of products from different categories work
together. It is therefore possible for a company to create differentiation based
on a group of products rather than a standalone product, which has been the
focus of extant studies on marketing.
However, the finding regarding functional diversification is based on a
single case study. Further studies using more cases could verify the finding.
Future research into component sharing across product categories could focus
on the demerits of sharing resulting from some kinds of product attributes, since
the software and circuits of the LSI of digital products are easier to share than
automobile engines, for example, because of differences relating to physical
limitations. Based on the ease of sharing, the effects could differ. The types of
products and the effects of a cross-product categories sharing strategy should be
classified and examined in future research.
Funding: This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 25885035.
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